JUDICIAL ACTIVISM VERSUS JUDICIAL OVERREACH
Dr. Rang Nath Singh
Corresponding Author • Dean
Department of Law
Dr. Santosh Kumar
Author • Ph.D. (Law), Independent Researcher & Legal Scholar
Independent Researcher & Legal Scholar
Author Details
Article Metadata
- Article Type
- Review Article
- Corresponding Author
- Dr. Rang Nath Singh
- Published In
- Multidisciplinary Research Journal of BDSU
- Volume / Issue
- 1 / 1
- Pages
- 178-189
Galley File
- Format
- File Name
- Judicial Activism Versus Judicial Overreach.pdf
- Size
- 6.08 MB
- Version
- 1
Abstract
The constitutional jurisprudence of India represents one of the most vibrant and transformative legal architectures in the democratic world. At the epicenter of this dynamic transformation lies the doctrine of Judicial Activism—a judicial posture wherein the higher judiciary actively interprets constitutional provisions to enforce socio-economic justice, protect marginalized classes, and remedy systemic administrative inertia. From its conceptual inception in the late 1970s through the liberalization of Locus Standi and the institutionalization of Public Interest Litigation (PIL), judicial activism has revolutionized the enforcement of Fundamental Rights under Articles 14, 19, 21, and 32. However, the continuous expansion of judicial intervention has ignited a fierce constitutional debate concerning the boundary separating legitimate 'Judicial Activism' from unwarranted 'Judicial Overreach' (or Judicial Imperialism). This scholarly research paper examines the theoretical genesis, constitutional validity, and functional evolution of judicial activism in India. It systematically analyzes landmark precedents ranging from Kesavananda Bharati, Maneka Gandhi, and Bandhua Mukti Morcha to pivotal contemporary rulings including the Electoral Bonds case (ADR v. UOI, 2024), Same-Sex Marriage recognition (Supriyo v. UOI, 2023), Sub-Classification in Reservations (State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024), and Demolition Jurisprudence/Bulldozer Justice (In Re: Directions in the matter of Demolition of Structures, 2024). The paper critically interrogates whether the judiciary's assumption of administrative, executive, and legislative functions impairs the tripartite doctrine of Separation of Powers and undermines constitutional equilibrium. Finally, the paper formulates institutional parameters and normative canons for judicial self-restraint to ensure that the judiciary remains a robust sentinel on the qui vive without imperiling democratic legitimacy. Keywords: Judicial Activism, Judicial Overreach, Public Interest Litigation (PIL), Separation of Powers, Article 21, Constitutionalism, Epistolary Jurisdiction, Judicial Self-Restraint.